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Abstract
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Introduction
This paper characterizes the set of payoﬀs achieved by equilibria that are robust to the spec-

iﬁcation of beliefs, and provides necessary and suﬃcient conditions for its non-emptiness. We
consider n-player repeated games with incomplete information and low discounting. This class of
equilibria has been introduced by Hörner and Lovo (2009) in two-player games with incomplete
information, as deﬁned by Aumann and Maschler (1995). A strategy proﬁle is a belief-free equilibrium if, after every history, every player’s continuation strategy is optimal, given his information,
and independently of the information held by the other players. That is, it must be a subgameperfect equilibrium for every game of complete information that is consistent with the player’s
information.
Such equilibria oﬀer several advantages. From a practical point of view, they do not require
the speciﬁcation of beliefs after all possible histories, and the veriﬁcation of their consistency with
Bayes’ rule. From a theoretical point of view, they represent a stringent reﬁnement, in the sense
that such equilibrium outcomes are also equilibrium outcomes for every Bayesian solution concept,
such as sequential equilibrium, for instance. But more importantly, these equilibria do not rely on
the Bayesian paradigm. To predict behavior in environments with unknown parameters, a model
typically includes a speciﬁcation of the players’ subjective probability distributions over these
unknowns, following Harsanyi (1967–1968). Since beliefs are irrelevant here, belief-free equilibria
do not require that players share a common prior, or that they update their beliefs according to
Bayes’ rule; and they remain equilibria even if players receive additional information as the game
unfolds.
Nevertheless, as in the case of games with complete information, players may randomize, and
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they maximize their expectation with respect to such lotteries.1 Belief-free equilibria require
precisely as much probabilistic sophistication as is usually assumed in games with complete information.
In Hörner and Lovo (2009), the analysis is restricted to two-player games, and the players’ private information has a “product” structure. That is, the information structure can be represented
as a matrix. Each state of nature corresponds to a cell in this matrix. Player 1 is informed of the
true row, while player 2 is informed of the true column. This paper generalizes these results to
the most general setting:
1. There are N ≥ 2 players, rather than only two players;
2. Arbitrary ﬁnite information structures are considered. In particular, the players’ combined
information may not pin down the state of nature. That is, the state of the world need not
be distributed knowledge.
This latter generalization requires an appropriate extension of the deﬁnition of belief-free equilibrium. We choose the most restrictive version, and require players to use strategies that are
best-replies independently of the state of nature, even for those states that cannot be identiﬁed
by the players’ combined information. Clearly, such an equilibrium remains an equilibrium for
weaker versions of this deﬁnition. For instance, one may wish to assume instead that each player
has a subjective probability distribution over those states of nature that the players’ combined
information cannot distinguish, and use this distribution to treat each such set as a singleton. We
do so for both practical and theoretical reasons. From a practical point of view, it is immediate
to modify our results to cope with less restrictive deﬁnitions, by replacing for instance such col1

This is also the standard assumption used in the literature on “non-Bayesian” equilibria (see, for instance,
Monderer and Tennenholtz, 1999).
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lections of states by a single state, and payoﬀs in that state by the relevant expectations.2 From a
theoretical point of view, it is unclear to us why an optimality criterion used by a single decisionmaker should depend on whether those states that he cannot distinguish can be distinguished
collectively or not.
The focus of the analysis is on the set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀ vectors as the discount
factor tends to one. We provide a set of necessary conditions deﬁning a closed, convex, and
possibly empty set. These necessary conditions have simple interpretations in terms of incentive
compatibility, individual rationality in every state, and joint rationality, an additional requirement
absent from the earlier analysis for two-player games, and that is related to the fact that, because
strategies depend on private information, there might be histories after which it is not possible
to uniquely identify the deviator. Conversely, we prove that every payoﬀ vector in the interior of
this set is a belief-free equilibrium payoﬀ vector provided that the discount factor is suﬃciently
close to one.
As mentioned, this set of payoﬀs might be empty, and therefore, belief-free equilibria need
not exist. We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the information structure for nonemptiness of this set for diﬀerent classes of payoﬀ functions. With two players, for instance,
non-emptiness was already known to obtain if each player knows his own payoﬀ, and one player is
informed of the state. For general payoﬀ functions, the necessary and suﬃcient condition is that
no two players are essential (as deﬁned in Section ﬁve) in distinguishing between any two states.
This result is due to Renault and Tomala (2004) for undiscounted games and we adapt it to our
setup. Our main result provides both a necessary and a suﬃcient condition for the important
case of known-own payoﬀs (KOP). In that case, non-emptiness obtains for all payoﬀ functions
satisfying KOP only if a given information structure satisﬁes the following. Divide the states into
2

Note that in this case the payoff function will depend on the beliefs used to compute such expectations.
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the ﬁnest partition with the property that for any two states lying in distinct cells of this partition,
at least three players distinguish them (i.e. get diﬀerent signals for those two states), and restrict
attention to the projection of the information partition on any given cell. Then for each state k,
there must exist a player i who is as well informed as all others at that state. Further, either no
player can distinguish any two states for which he is not the best informed player (if he ever is),
or there is a second player j 6= i who is as well informed as all players but i at that state. This
latter case is shown to be suﬃcient. Our next result states that, if the payoﬀ functions are such
that some action proﬁle yields a payoﬀ no larger than the individually rational payoﬀ (the bad
outcome property), for all players and for all states simultaneously, then it must be that no single
player is essential to distinguish between any two states. Finally, for the class of payoﬀ function
that satisfy both KOP and the bad outcome property, we show that there must be at most one
essential player per state.
A special class of games covered by these conditions is the class of “reputation” games in which
there is exactly one player whose payoﬀ type is unknown. We identify the value of reputation for
such games. Consider the lowest belief-free equilibrium payoﬀ that this player can guarantee for
a given set of alternative payoﬀ types he might be. We identify the highest such payoﬀ, across all
sets of alternative types, and identify a set of types achieving this maximum.
The set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs has already appeared in the literature, most notably
(but not only) for two players, in the context of undiscounted Nash equilibrium payoﬀs for games
with one-sided incomplete information. See, among others, Cripps and Thomas (2003), Forges
and Minelli (1997), Koren (1992) and Shalev (1994). The most general characterization of Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs is obtained by Hart (1985) for the case of one-sided incomplete information.
A survey is provided by Forges (1992). For more than two players, Renault (2001) studies threeplayer games with two informed players and one uninformed player, and introduces the joint
5

rationality condition in this context. Renault and Tomala (2004a) study existence for all payoﬀ
functions in the n-player case.
Our work is also related to the literature on existence of equilibria for non-zero-sum undiscounted games with incomplete information. It is known since Aumann and Maschler (1995)
that some conditions on information structures are required to get existence. Sorin (1983) shows
existence of belief-based equilibrium in two-player games with one-sided incomplete information
and two states of nature. Simon, Spież and Toruńczyk (1995) extend this result to an arbitrary
number of states. For more than two players, no general result is known. See for instance Renault
(2001) for 3-player games with lack of information on one-side.
Israeli (1999) provides an analysis of reputation in two-player undiscounted games, to which
our own analysis of reputation owes a great deal. Further references to non-Bayesian studies
can be found in Hörner and Lovo (2009). Finally, Pęski (2008) considers discounted games with
known-own payoﬀs, two states of the world, and one informed player. He deﬁnes the set of payoﬀs
that satisfy both individually rationality after every history, and incentive compatibility, and
shows that its closure is equal to the limit set (as the discount factor tends to one) of the Nash
equilibrium payoﬀs, under full dimensionality. Therefore, his result shows that, at least in his
set-up, the notion of individual rationality that captures Nash equilibrium is expected individual
rationality after every history (where the expectation is, for the uninformed player, with respect to
his beliefs about the state). In contrast, the notion of individual rationality that captures belieffree equilibrium is individual rationality for every state (what he calls IR-in-every-state.) The
equivalence of those two notions of individual rationality in the case of undiscounted payoﬀs is the
main reason why the characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs is reminiscent of some of the
results in the literature on Nash equilibrium payoﬀs of undiscounted games. Understanding the
relationship between the two payoﬀ sets in general environments is an important open question.
6

Belief-free equilibrium is also related to ex post equilibrium, used in mechanism design (see
Crémer and McLean, 1985) as well as in large games (see Kalai, 2004). A recent study of ex post
equilibria and related belief-free solution concepts in the context of static games of incomplete
information is provided by Bergemann and Morris (2007).
The notion of belief-free equilibria has been introduced in games with imperfect monitoring.
See Piccione (2002), Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005), among others.
In this literature, belief-free equilibria are deﬁned as equilibria for which continuation strategies
are optimal independently of the private history observed by the other players, and has allowed
the construction of equilibria in cases in which only trivial equilibria were known so far.
The most closely related papers are Hörner and Lovo (2009), already discussed, and Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2009a, 2009b). Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2009b), which itself generalizes
Fudenberg and Yamamoto (2009a), is complementary to this paper. By combining belief-free equilibrium with perfect public equilibrium, they extend the analysis to the case of repeated games
with incomplete information, and imperfect and unknown monitoring. That is, players receive imperfect public signals and the map from actions into signal distributions is itself unknown. Their
contribution is two-fold. First, they develop linear algebraic techniques to study the limit payoﬀ
set, whose usefulness is illustrated via examples. Second, they use these techniques to provide
suﬃcient conditions for the folk theorem to hold. The latter contribution is especially important,
as it provides conditions under which, as far as limit payoﬀs are concerned, the restriction to these
equilibria is without loss of generality.
The paper is related more broadly to the literature on the robustness of equilibrium in repeated
games. Miller (2009) develops a related notion, in which the ex post requirement is imposed in each
period, but players’ continuation payoﬀs are evaluated according to their beliefs. Chassang and
Takahashi (2009) examine the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information that is modelled
7

by payoﬀ shocks that are independent across periods. Wiseman (2008) considers the case in which
the payoﬀ matrix is unknown, but players learn over time, and provides conditions under which a
folk theorem obtains.
Section two introduces the notation and deﬁnes belief-free equilibria. Section three gives
necessary conditions that belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs must satisfy. Section four shows that
every payoﬀ vector in the interior of the set deﬁned by the necessary conditions is indeed a belieffree equilibrium payoﬀ vector for low enough discounting. Section ﬁve provides necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for non-emptiness of this set. Section six applies the previous results to
games of reputation with one informed player.

2

Notations

The ﬁnite set of players is N := {1, . . . , N}. Player i chooses action ai from a ﬁnite set Ai , and
Q
a ∈ A := i Ai is an action proﬁle. The ﬁnite state space is K := {1, . . . , K}. Given a set S, let
△S denote the probability simplex over S, 1{S} the indicator function of S, |S| the cardinality

of S, int S the interior of S, and co S the convex hull of S. To avoid trivialities, assume that
|Ai | ≥ 2, all i ∈ N.
Player i’s reward function is a map ui : K × A → R. Let M := maxi∈N,k∈K,a∈A |ui(k, a)|.
A reward proﬁle is denoted u := (u1 , . . . , uN ). Mixed actions of player i are denoted αi . The
deﬁnition of rewards is extended to mixed, possibly correlated, action proﬁles µ ∈ △A in the
usual way.
At the beginning of the game, each player receives once and for all a signal that allows him to
narrow down the set of possible states of nature. Without loss of generality (see Aumann, 1976),
this process can be represented by an information structure I := (I1 , . . . , IN ), where Ii denotes
8

player i’s information partition of K. We let Ii (k) denote the element of Ii containing k. We
Q
Q
refer to Ii (k) =: θi ∈ Θi as player i’s type, and write Θ := i Θi , and Θ−i := j6=i Θj . Given
T
θ ∈ Θ, κ(θ) := i∈N θi denote the set of states that are consistent with type proﬁle θ. Also, for
T
θ−i ∈ Θ−i , we write κ(θ−i ) := j6=i θj for the set of states that are consistent with a type proﬁle

of all players but i. We do not require that κ(θ) 6= ∅: it might be that some type proﬁle cannot

arise. Similarly, it might be that |κ(θ)| > 1: the join of the players’ information partitions need
not reduce to the state. The information partitions are common knowledge, but the realized signal
is private information.
The game is inﬁnitely repeated, with periods t = 0, 1, 2, . . .. A history of length t is a vector ht ∈
H t := At (H 0 := {∅}). An outcome is an inﬁnite history h ∈ H := A∞ . Neither mixed actions
nor realized payoﬀs are observed. On the other hand, realized actions are perfectly observed.
A behavior strategy for player i’s type θi is a mapping σi,θi : ∪t∈N H t → △Ai . We write σi :=
{σi,θi }θi ∈Θi for player i’s strategy, and σ := (σ1 , . . . , σN ) for a strategy proﬁle.
Players use a common discount factor δ < 1. The payoff of player i in state k is the expected
average discounted sum of rewards, where the expectation is taken with respect to mixed action
proﬁles. That is, given some outcome h = (a0 , . . . , at , . . .), player i’s payoﬀ in state k is
X

t≥0

(1 − δ)δ t ui (k, at ).

As usual, the domain of rewards is extended to mixed action proﬁles and strategy proﬁles. Given
a strategy proﬁle σ, let µk ∈ △A denote the occupation measure over action proﬁles induced by σ
when the state is k, that is, for every a ∈ A,

µk (a) := (1 − δ) Eσ

hX
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t≥0

i
δ t 1{at = a} .

Let u(k, µk ) ∈ RN denote the players’ payoﬀ vector in state k under the occupation measure µk :

u(k, µk ) :=

X

a∈A

µk (a)u(k, a).

Definition: A belief-free equilibrium (hereafter, an equilibrium) is a strategy proﬁle σ such
that, for every state k, σ is a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game with rewards u(k, ·). A
vector v ∈ RN K is an equilibrium payoff vector if there exists an equilibrium σ such that v = u(σ).
In what follows, we write v k for the payoﬀ vector in state k. Let Bδ be the set of belief
free equilibrium (BFE) payoﬀ vectors of the δ-discounted game. The purpose of this paper is to
characterize limδ→1 Bδ (a limit that is shown to be well-deﬁned) and establish conditions under
which this limit set is non-empty.

3

Necessary Conditions
We ﬁrst derive necessary conditions for a vector v ∈ RN K to be an equilibrium payoﬀ vector.

These conditions can be divided into three categories: feasibility, incentive compatibility, and
(individual and joint) rationality.

3.1

Feasibility

Definition: The payoﬀ vector v ∈ RN K is feasible if there exists (µk )k∈K ∈ (△A)K such that
1. ∀k ∈ K : v k = u(k, µk );
2. ∀k, k ′ : Ii (k) = Ii (k ′ ) ∀i ∈ N ⇒ µk = µk′ .
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The ﬁrst condition is the obvious feasibility condition. That is, there exists an occupation
measure µk that yields the payoﬀ vector v k .
The second condition is rather a measurability restriction. It states that, if players cannot
collectively distinguish two states, then the equilibrium occupation measures over action proﬁles
must be the same in both states. Given the second condition, we may alternatively write µθ for
the occupation measure. Conversely, throughout the paper, the notation (µθ )θ∈Θ implies that the
set (µk )k∈K satisﬁes the second condition.

3.2

Incentive Compatibility

If two signals θi and θi′ are both consistent with a signal proﬁle θ−i of the other players, it must
be the case that player i weakly prefers the occupation measure µθi ,θ−i to µθi′ ,θ−i in every state that
is possible given (θi , θ−i ). Therefore, if v is an equilibrium payoﬀ vector, then it must be feasible
for some probability distributions satisfying a set of incentive compatibility conditions.
To introduce those, deﬁne UDi (for unilateral deviation) as the set of triples (θi , θi′ , θ−i ) ∈
Θi × Θi × Θ−i such that κ(θi , θ−i ) 6= ∅ and κ(θi′ , θ−i ) 6= ∅. The incentive compatibility conditions
can be written as
∀i, (θi , θi′ , θ−i ) ∈ UDi , k ∈ κ (θi , θ−i ) : ui(k, µθi ,θ−i ) ≥ ui(k, µθi′ ,θ−i ). (IC(i, θi , θi′ , θ−i ))
Lemma 3.1 If v ∈ Bδ , then v is feasible for some (µθ )θ∈Θ that satisfy IC(i, θi , θi′ , θ−i ) for all
i ∈ N and (θi , θi′ , θ−i ) ∈ UDi .
Proof: Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some i ∈ N and (θi , θi′ , θ−i ) ∈ UDi , the
reverse inequality holds. Consider now the game of complete information in which the state is
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k, and consider player i of type θi . By playing as if his type were θi′ , player i can guarantee
ui (k, µθi′ ,θ−i ), which exceeds his equilibrium payoﬀ ui(k, µθi ,θ−i ). This is a proﬁtable deviation. 

3.3

Individual and Joint Rationality

A deviating player might be easy to identify or not. For instance, if player i chooses an action
that is inconsistent with all his types’ equilibrium strategies, then it is immediately common
knowledge among players that i deviated. Since we seek to identify here a necessary condition
that player i’s equilibrium payoﬀ vector must satisfy, the more eﬀective the punishment, the
weaker the condition. Therefore, we may start by assuming that, if player i deviates, all other
players commonly know the information that is distributed among them, as these are the most
favorable conditions for a punishment. This is also the reason why we may assume that player i’s
deviation is common knowledge, even if, for some deviations by i, this need not be.
Still, if the set of states κ(θ−i ) is not a singleton, players −i cannot tailor the punishment
strategy to the actual state of the world. Suppose, for instance, that κ(θ−i ) = {1, 2}, as illustrated
in Figure 1. Because player −i’s strategy, after such a deviation, must be eﬀective in both games
of complete information simultaneously, it must guarantee that player i’s payoﬀ is lower than vi
in both its coordinates, independently of what strategy player i uses. Note that it is irrelevant
whether player i can distinguish these two states himself.
Determining for which values of the vector vi players −i have such a strategy available may
appear a formidable task, but as is well-known, this is by deﬁnition equivalent (at least in the
undiscounted case) to the orthant W := {vi } − R2+ being an approachable set, and necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for this are provided by Blackwell (1956).
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player i’s payoﬀ in state 2
6

The set W must
be approachable
by players −i
svi

W
-

player i’s payoﬀ in state 1

Figure 1: Players −i must have a strategy that guarantees that i’s payoﬀ lies in W .
To this end, deﬁne, for θ−i ∈ Θ−i,

ϕi,θ (q) :=

min
max
Q
α−i ∈ j6=i △Aj ai ∈Ai

X

k∈κ(θ−i )

q(k)ui (k, α−i , ai ).

For each player i and each θ−i ∈ Θ−i , consider the set of inequalities

∀q ∈ △κ(θ−i ) :

X

k∈κ(θ−i )

q(k)vik ≥ ϕi,θ (q).

(IR(i, θ−i ))

These inequalities are the immediate generalizations of the individual rationality conditions for
the two-player case. Note that if κ(θ−i ) = ∅, the inequality is vacuously satisﬁed. If κ(θ−i ) is a
singleton set {k}, the inequality reduces to the familiar deﬁnition of individual rationality under
complete information, i.e. vik ≥ val ui(k, ·), where val ui (k, ·) denotes player i’s minmax payoﬀ in
state k. In the deﬁnition of ϕi,θ , note that the action of players −i are statistically independent.
Lemma 3.2 If v ∈ Bδ , it satisfies the inequalities (IR(i, θ−i )) for each player i and θ−i .
Proof: If one of these conditions is violated, there necessarily exists one player, a type proﬁle
13

θ−i and q ∈ △κ(θ−i ) such that the reverse inequality holds. This implies that for every α−i , there
exists ai (α−i ) ∈ Ai such that
X

k∈κ(θ−i )

q(k)ui(k, α−i , ai (α−i )) >

X

k∈κ(θ−i )

q(k)vik .

(1)

Assume instead that v is in Bδ and let σ be the corresponding equilibrium. Note that players −i
play the same strategy in each state k ∈ κ(θ−i ). Consider thus the strategy τi of player i that
plays ai (α−i ) after a history ht such that σ−i (ht ) = α−i . The reward of player i under (τi , σ−i )
satisﬁes the inequality (1) and therefore, so does the payoﬀ. It follows that there exists a state
k ∈ κ(θ−i ) at which τ is a proﬁtable deviation.



Under these conditions, following Blackwell (1956), players −i can devise a punishing strategy
against player i. Given θ−i , and any payoﬀ vector v that satisﬁes these inequalities strictly, there
θ

θ

exists ε > 0 and a strategy proﬁle sb−i−i for players −i such that, if players −i use sb−i−i , then

player i’s undiscounted payoﬀ in any state k that is consistent with θ−i is less than vik − ε in any
suﬃciently long ﬁnite-horizon version of the game, no matter i’s strategy. By continuity, this also
holds true for suﬃciently long ﬁnite-horizon versions of the game when payoﬀs are discounted,
provided the discount factor is high enough, ﬁxing the length of the game. When players −i use
θ

sb−i−i , players −i are said to minmax player i. Player i is the punished player, and players −i are

the punishing players.

While individual rationality is a necessary condition, it is not the only one. There are other
conceivable deviations, leading to an additional necessary condition. In particular, even if a
deviation gets detected, it might not be possible to identify the deviator. It might be that i’s
action is consistent with some of his types’ strategies, and so is player j’s action, but no pair
of types for which both actions would be simultaneously consistent exists. Then it is common
14

knowledge among all players that some player deviated, but not necessarily whether it is player i
or j. With two players, of course, the identity of the deviator is always common knowledge.
To be more formal, let D be the set of type proﬁles that are inconsistent, but could arise if there
was a unilateral deviation. That is, θ is in D if κ(θ) = ∅ and Ωθ := {(i, θi′ ) | i ∈ N, κ(θi′ , θ−i ) 6=
∅} =
6 ∅. In other words, if players were to report their types, and the reported proﬁle was in D,
all players would know that one player must have lied. The set Ωθ is the set of pairs (player, type)
that could have caused the problematic announcement θ.
For each θ ∈ D, consider the condition
∃µ ∈ △A, ∀(i, θi′ ) ∈ Ωθ , ∀k ∈ κ (θi′ , θ−i ) : vik ≥ ui (k, µ).

(JR (θ))

These inequalities are called Joint Rationality (JR), since they involve payoﬀs of diﬀerent players
simultaneously.3 Note that joint rationality does not imply individual rationality (there is no
requirement that player i’s action be a best-reply), nor is it implied by it.
Lemma 3.3 Every v ∈ Bδ satisfies all constraints (JR (θ))θ∈D .
Proof: Let v ∈ Bδ be an equilibrium payoﬀ vector and σ be the corresponding equilibrium.
Let θ = (θi )i ∈ D and consider for each (i, θi′ ) ∈ Ωθ the deviation τ i of player i such that, if his
type is θi′ , player i plays as if he were of type θi , i.e. τi,θi′ = σi,θi , and which coincides with σi for
all other types. Take two elements (i, θi′ ) and (j, θj′ ) in Ωθ . The distribution over outcomes under
(τi,θi′ , σ−i,θ−i ) and (τj,θj′ , σ−j,θ−j ) are the same, i.e. this is the distribution under σθ = (σl,θl )l∈N . In
words, there is no way to distinguish the situation in which player i consistently mimics type θi
and the one in which player j consistently mimics type θj . Let µ ∈ △A denote the occupation
3

Joint Rationality has been first introduced in Renault (2001) in a three-player setup.
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measure generated by σθ . If JR (θ) is violated, there exists a player i and a state k ∈ κ (θ−i ) such
that player i’s equilibrium payoﬀ in state k, vik , is strictly lower than his payoﬀ if he were to follow
σθi , a contradiction.



To conclude this section, we note that the conditions JR (θ) are closely related to the conditions
IR(i, θ). Indeed, using the minmax theorem, we may write those inequalities in the following
alternative and compact way

∀q ∈ △{(i, k) : k ∈ κ(θ−i )} :

X

i,k

q(i, k)vik ≥ min
a∈A

X

i,k

q (i, k) ui (k, a) ,

which suggests interpreting the identity of the deviator as part of the uncertainty itself. For the
sake of brevity, we often omit arguments and refer to each type of condition simply as IC, IR, or
JR.

4

Sufficient Conditions
Let V ∗ ⊂ RKN denote the set of feasible payoﬀ vectors that satisfy IC, IR, and JR. We show

that this set characterizes the set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀ vectors, up to its boundary
points.

T
Let K̂ := k ∈ K : i∈N Ii (k) 6= {k} be the set of states that cannot be distinguished by the

join of the players’ information partitions. Let û be the matrix (uki (a)) with N × |K̂| rows and
|A| columns, where k belongs to K̂. The reward function u is generic if the matrix û has rank
N × |K̂|. Indeed, viewing any such matrix as an element of RN |K̂||A| , this condition is generically
satisﬁed whenever |A| ≥ N|K̂|. The ﬁrst main result of this paper is the following.
Theorem 4.1 If v ∈ int V ∗ and u is generic, there exists δ̄ < 1, ∀δ > δ̄, v ∈ Bδ .
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The interiority assumption is rather standard in the literature on repeated games with discounting, and has been ﬁrst introduced by Fudenberg and Maskin (1986). In the appendix, we
provide a proof under the additional assumptions that there exists a public randomization device
in every period (an independent draw from the uniform distribution on the unit interval), and
that players can send costless messages, or reports, at the end of every period, as well as before the
ﬁrst period of the game. The proof without such a device or communication is rather standard
but very lenghty, and can be found in the working paper (Hörner, Lovo and Tomala, 2009).
The rank assumption serves a similar purpose, as it allows players to provide appropriate
incentives in states that cannot be distinguished.
It is worth making the following two remarks. First, if I and I ′ are two diﬀerent information structures for the same game, and V ∗ , V ′∗ are the corresponding sets of feasible, incentive
compatible, individually and jointly rational payoﬀ vectors, observe that V ∗ ⊆ V ′∗ if Ii′ is ﬁner
than Ii for all i ∈ N. That is, the limit set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs is monotonic with
respect to the information structure, under the natural ordering on such structures. Second, note
that the IC, IR and JR conditions remain necessary even if we drop the sequential rationality
constraint imposed by subgame-perfection. That is, the same characterization would hold if belieffree equilibria was deﬁned with respect to Nash equilibria of the underlying complete information
game.

5

Existence
Our main theorem states that, given V ∗ 6= ∅, all points in the interior of V ∗ are BFE payoﬀs if

δ is large enough. However, achieving incentive compatibility together with individual rationality
and joint rationality might not be possible, as is already known from the two-player case, and
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some conditions are required. In this section, we give necessary and suﬃcient conditions for nonemptiness of V ∗ . We shall not address the issue of whether boundary points of V ∗ are themselves
equilibria or not. Even in the case of complete information, it is not known under which conditions
minmax payoﬀs are equilibrium payoﬀs themselves (this is the case, generically, when attention is
restricted to pure strategies and there exist points in the feasible payoﬀ set that give each player his
minmax payoﬀ (Thomas, 1995)), and such conditions appear all the more elusive here given that
both IR and JR are multi-dimensional versions of individual rationality. Incentive compatibility,
however, is an additional condition, and we will comment on when it can be made strict (this is
the case, for instance, for our ﬁrst set of results). As a practical matter, it is immediate to apply
the characterization of V ∗ to verify that the set has non-empty interior. Note that Fudenberg
and Yamamoto (2009b) provide useful suﬃcient conditions for this to be the case. Note also that,
as mentioned, V ∗ has been shown to play an important role in the study of Nash equilibria in
repeated games without discounting, for those special cases in which such a characterization has
been obtained so far.
More precisely, we consider diﬀerent classes of games each characterized by some properties
of the reward functions and/or of the information structure. For each one of these classes we
prove that V ∗ is not empty by identifying payoﬀs vectors satisfying IC, IR and JR, and provide
counter-examples within those classes for the necessity part. Given the set of players N, the set
of states K and the set of actions proﬁles A, let U := (RK×A )N be the set of all reward functions
and Y be the set of information structures. For an information structure I and a reward function
u, we denote by V ∗ (I, u) the set of payoﬀ vectors that satisfy IC, IR and JR.
We might wish to examine for which information structures non-emptiness obtains for all
reward functions, or for all reward functions within some class S ⊆ U. We shall consider this
ﬁrst. Second, we examine for which reward functions non-emptiness obtains independently of the
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information structure. This, in particular, will ensure existence for the applications in which the
assumption that the information partitions are common knowledge appears exorbitant. We shall
address this next. Proofs are outlined in the text and, when necessary, detailed in the appendices
B–E.

5.1

Majority Components

It is useful to identify the information that can be readily disclosed either because it is shared by
suﬃciently many players or, for 2-player games, because it is common knowledge. For instance, if
three (or more) players know the state of nature, it is straightforward to provide those players with
strict incentives to disclose it: each informed player reports the true state (through an appropriate
choice of actions); under any unilateral deviation, there are still at least two players (a majority)
among informed players who report it truthfully. Truth-telling is thus optimal, and the state is
revealed.
More generally, we shall make precise the information about the state that can be made
common knowledge among players even under unilateral deviations. This will deﬁne a partition
over the set of states K. An element of this partition is a majority component. That is, if the true
state k belongs to the majority component A, then under strategies that ask players to report
whether the state is in A or not, it becomes common knowledge that the true state lies in A once
the reports are made, and even if a player unilaterally deviates.
This requires that, for every k ′′ ∈ K \ A, at least three players know that the state is not k ′′ ,
so that, even if one of them deviates, at least two players’ reports rule out k ′′ . Conversely, if two
states k and k ′ belong to the same majority component A, then, for some report of some player,
there are no two other players who could, by reporting truthfully, distinguish between k and k ′ .
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To deﬁne a majority component formally, we introduce the following equivalence relation.
Definition 5.1
- For each pair of states k, k ′ , let ν(k, k ′ ) be the number of players who distinguish k from k ′ .
Define the binary relation R by kRk ′ iff ν(k, k ′ ) ≤ min{2, N − 1}.
- Let k ∼ k ′ iff there is a chain of states k = k1 , k2 , ..., kn = k ′ such that km Rkm+1 for each
m. A majority component of K is an equivalence class of this relation.
Note that R is symmetric but not necessarily transitive, and ∼ is the transitive closure of R
(i.e. the smallest transitive extension of R), thus it is an equivalence relation.
If A, B are two distinct majority components of K, then for each k ∈ A and each k ′ in B,
ν(k, k ′ ) ≥ 3. Otherwise, there would exist a link (for the relation R) between some point in A and
some point in B, and thus a chain linking any point in A to any point in B. Note that for 2-player
games two states belong to the same majority component only if they can be distinguished by at
most one player.
The study of belief-free equilibria can be made on each majority component separately. Given
A ⊆ K, let IA denote the information structure on A induced by I:

IA,i (k) = Ii (k) ∩ A, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ∈ A.

Note that, by deﬁnition, a BFE given K and I must induce a BFE given A and IA . If A is a
majority component, the discussion above can be summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 V ∗ (u, I) 6= ∅ iff for each majority component A, V ∗ (u, IA ) 6= ∅.
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5.2

Existence for Various Reward Functions

In this subsection, we focus on information structures such that for each k, ∩i∈N Ii (k) = {k}.
In this instance, K̂ = ∅ and the reward function u trivially satisfy the genericity condition of
Theorem 4.1.4
5.2.1

No restriction on rewards: S = U

The following result identiﬁes the restriction on the information structure that ensures that
BFE exists for all reward functions (see also Renault and Tomala, 2004a).
Theorem 5.3 V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ U, if and only if all majority components are singletons.
The proof is straightforward and follows the theorems 3.2. and 3.3. in Renault and Tomala
(2004a). The condition is obviously suﬃcient. If all majority components are singletons, then the
true state k can be identiﬁed by truthful announcements. Unilateral deviations are disregarded.
Then a feasible and individually rational payoﬀ vector in the revealed state k is implemented. For
the necessity part we provide an example in Appendix B.
This condition is obviously very demanding, although BFE might very well exist for a given
reward function. The remainder of this section examines how the condition is relaxed once restrictions are imposed on the reward function. Without loss of generality, given Lemma 5.2, we
assume hereafter that there is a single majority component, with at least two states (if there is a
single state, existence is immediate).
4

This is without loss of generality when players have known-own payoff. If no such restriction is imposed on
rewards, then it is also necessary for non-emptiness of V ∗ . For example, if each player’s reward function depends
only on his own action and on the state, and the optimal action is not the same in two states that no player
distinguishes, then BFE do not exist.
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5.2.2

Known-own payoffs

In this subsection we provide a condition on the information structure that is necessary to
obtain V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅ in all games of known-own payoﬀ, and a suﬃcient condition for non-emptiness.
Definition 5.4 The game has known-own payoﬀs (KOP) if the reward function of each player i
depends only on the action profile and on her type. That is, for each action profile a, and each
pair of states k, k ′ :
Ii (k) = Ii (k ′ ) =⇒ ui (k, a) = ui (k ′ , a).
Let SI be the set of KOP reward functions when the information structure is I.
Note that the deﬁnition of known-own payoﬀ implies that

T

i∈N

Ii (k) = {k}. In two-player

games with KOP, existence obtains whenever information is one-sided, that is, whenever player 1
has more information than player 2 (Shalev, 1994). These conditions are also necessary in twoplayer games: Hörner and Lovo (2009) and Koren (1992) provide examples in which existence fails
if information is two-sided. One might then expect that this result might generalize to N-player
games with KOP. However, the following example shows that having one fully informed player is
not suﬃcient to ensure existence.
Example 5.5 There are three states k, k ′ , k ′′ . The information of player 1 is I1 (k) = {k, k ′′ },
I1 (k ′ ) = {k ′ }. The information of player 2 is I2 (k) = {k, k ′ }, I2 (k ′′ ) = {k ′′ }. Player 3 knows the
state. The payoff matrix is as follows.
L

R

L

R

L

R

T

3, 1, 0 0, 0, 0

T

3, 0, 3

0, 1, 3

T

1, 1, 0

1, 0, 3

B

0, 0, 0 1, 3, 0

B

0, 0, 3

1, 1, 0

B

0, 0, 3

0, 3, 3

state k

state k ′′
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state k ′

In this game, V ∗ is empty. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a point v in V ∗ .
Individual rationality of players 1 and 2 imply that in state k ′ , T is always played, and (T, R) is
played with a (discounted) frequency no greater than 1/4. The payoff of player 3 in state k ′ is thus
′

v3k ≤ 3/4. Similarly, in state k ′′ , R is always played, and (T, R) with frequency no greater than
′′

1/4. The payoff of player 3 in state k ′′ is thus v3k ≤ 3/4.
Consider now the inconsistent reports in which player 1 claims that the state is k ′ , while player
3 claims that the state is k. Continuation play must “punish” player 1 in state k, and player 3 in
′

state k ′ . Note that, for every action profile a, uk1 (a) + uk3 (a) ≥ 3. Now, assume that the payoff of
player 1 in state k is such that: v1k ≤

11
3.
16

vk1 + vk3′ ≤

It follows that
11
3 + 3/4 = 45/16 < 3.
16

This latter inequality is impossible. From JR, there must exist a distribution α of action profiles
′

′

′

such that v1k ≥ uk1 (α) and v3k ≥ uk3 (α) and uk1 (α) + uk3 (α) ≥ 3. We conclude that v1k >

11
3.
16

A

similar argument (considering the inconsistent reports in which player 2 claims that the state is
k ′′ and player 3 claims that the state is k) yields v2k >

11
3.
16

Thus vk1 + vk2 > 66/16 = 4 + 1/8, which

is impossible, since no action profile in state k yields uk1 + uk2 > 4.
In what follows we show that if V ∗ is nonempty in all games with KOP, then for each state k,
ﬁrst, there exists a player i who is as well informed as all others at that state, and second, either
no player can distinguish any two states for which he is not the best informed player (if he ever
is), or there is a second player j 6= i who is as well informed as all players but i at that state. In
this latter case, we show that V ∗ is nonempty in all games with KOP.
More formally, we say that player i has more information than player j if player i can deduce
player j’s type from his own type, i.e. if player i’s information partition is ﬁner than player j’s
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partition: Ii (k) ⊆ Ij (k) for each k.
Definition 5.6

1. The information structure is locally weakly embedded (LWE) if for each

state k, there exists a pair of players i, j, such that player i has more information than any
other player, and player j has more information than any player other than i. Note that i, j
may depend on the state5 .
2. The information structure has the all-or-nothing property if there exists a partition of K,
K = ∪i=1,...,N Ki with Ki possibly empty, such that for each i, Ii (k) = {k} if k ∈ Ki ,
Ii (k) = K \ Ki otherwise.
We have the following result (recall that attention is restricted, without loss of generality, to
a single component).
Theorem 5.7 If V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ SI , then the information structure is locally weakly embedded, or has the all-or-nothing property. Further, if the information structure is locally weakly
embedded, then V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ SI .
The proof is rather involved and is deferred to Appendix C. In order to prove necessity, we establish
a structural result on information structures with a single majority component. This reduces the
number of conﬁgurations for which counter-examples (in which V ∗ (I, u) = ∅ for some u ∈ SI )
must be provided whenever the information structure is neither LWE nor has the all-or-nothing
property. The suﬃciency part relies on the following lemma.
Lemma 5.8 Consider a N-player finite game with actions sets Ai and payoff functions ui and
let ui = minα−i ∈×j6=i △Aj maxai ∈Ai ui (ai , α−i ) be players i’s individual rationality level. There exists
5

It is not difficult to check that the pair (i, j) is the same for all states in the same majority component.
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∗
α−1
, such that
∗
∀i 6= 1, ∀α1 , ui (α1 , α−1
) ≥ ui

This states that N − 1 players can play cooperatively in order to secure their minmax level,
irrespective of the behavior of player 1. A more general statement is proved in Appendix C. With
known-own payoﬀs, one can easily deduce non-emptiness of V ∗ , if player 1 is informed of the state
∗
and the other players have no information. They just have to play such a proﬁle α−1
, and player

1 takes a best-reply given his actual reward function. If there are two (partially) informed players
1 and 2, we use a sequential construction where player 1 announces his mixed action, allowing the
other players to secure their individually rational levels, irrespective of the action of player 2.
Unfortunately, we were unable to prove or disprove existence in the remaining case of information structures satisfying the all-or-nothing property. Countless numerical simulations suggest
the following conjecture.
Conjecture 5.9 The set V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty for all u ∈ SI if and only if the information
structure is locally weakly embedded, or has the all-or-nothing property.
5.2.3

Bad outcome

In this subsection, we consider a class of reward functions in which there is a distribution of
action proﬁles which yields a low payoﬀ to all players simultaneously. This encompasses many
economic settings, e.g. environments with quasi-linear utilities.
Definition 5.10 The reward function has a bad outcome if there exists a distribution over action
profiles that provides each player with no more than his minmax payoff in each state:
∃µo ∈ △A, ∀i ∈ N, ∀k ∈ K, ui (k, µo ) ≤ uki ,
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with uki := minα−i ∈Qj6=i △Aj maxai ∈Ai ui(k, ai , α−i). Let B be the set of payoff functions that have a
bad outcome.
For each player i and state k, denote by I−i (k) := ∩l6=i Il (k) the combined information of the
other players at k. We say that player i is essential at k if I−i (k) 6= {k}. The information structure
I has no essential player if, for each state k, no player is essential at k.
Theorem 5.11 V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ B, if and only if I has no essential player.
The proof is straightforward and the intuition is as follows. Let players report their type.
Then either a state is identiﬁed, or there is an inconsistency in the reports. In that case, the bad
outcome is played long enough to deter such deviations. Details are provided in Appendix D.
5.2.4

Known-own-payoffs and bad outcome

Assuming both known-own-payoﬀs and bad outcome yields existence for a broader set of
information structures.
Theorem 5.12 V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ SI ∩ B, if and only if I has at most one essential player in
each state.
The proof of this result can be found in Appendix E.

5.3

Existence for all Information Structures

Our objective is to ﬁnd conditions on the reward function u such that V ∗ is non-empty independently of the information structure. Note ﬁrst that V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty for all information
structure I ∈ Y if and only if V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty for the coarser information structure I, i.e.
for Ii (k) = K for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ K. Necessity is trivial. Suﬃciency follows from our earlier
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observation that, for any pair of comparable information structures I and I ′ , with I ′ ﬁner than
I (i.e., Ii′ ﬁner than Ii for all i), if V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty, then V ∗ (I ′ , u) is also non-empty. Let
ϕi (q) :=

max
min
Q
α−i ∈ j6=i △Aj ai ∈Ai

X

k∈K

q(k)ui(k, α−i , ai ).

Proposition 5.13 The set V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty for all I if and only if there exists a distribution
over action profile µ∗ ∈ △A such that, for each i ∈ N,

∀q ∈ △K :

X

k∈K

q(k)ui(k, µ∗ ) ≥ ϕi (q).

Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that when I satisﬁes Ii (k) = K for all i ∈ N and all k ∈ K,
then the conditions of the proposition are necessary and suﬃcient for V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅. Suﬃciency:
Consider the payoﬀ vector v ∗ obtained by implementing the distribution µ∗ independently of the
state. This payoﬀ is clearly IC and JR since it is achieved using a strategy that is independent
of the state. This payoﬀ vector satisﬁes IR since the condition on µ∗ states that no player i in
no state k can guarantee more than vik∗ when the other players use the Blackwell punishment
strategy corresponding to a situation in which player i knows the state and the other players do
not. Necessity: note ﬁrst that the equilibrium play must be independent of the state because of
feasibility condition 2. Second, suppose that there exists no µ∗ satisfying the condition of the
proposition. In other words for each µ ∈ △A there exists a player i and q µ ∈ △K such that
X

k∈K

q µ (k)ui (k, µ) < ϕi (q µ ).

This implies that for any candidate equilibrium payoﬀ achieved with some distribution over action
proﬁles µ that is independent of the state, there exists a player i that ﬁnds it proﬁtable to deviate
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in some state.



The condition of proposition 5.13 is trivially satisﬁed when it is possible to ﬁnd a pooling
equilibrium distribution µ∗ and a punishment strategy that is independent of the state. This is
the case, for instance, in most auction formats and oligopoly games (take a very high and a very
low price, or quantity).
When focusing on ﬁner information structures in which players have non-degenerate types,
punishment strategies sustaining an equilibrium can depend on types. There are some obvious
properties of the reward functions ensuring existence, if one gives up the requirement that existence
obtains for all information structures. Proposition 5.14 provides a useful criterion, which is the
N-player counterpart of condition 4 in Hörner and Lovo (2009). Let D̂ be the set of type proﬁles
that are consistent with some state after deletion of some player’s type. That is,

D̂ := {θ ∈

Y

i∈N

Θi : ∃i ∈ N, κ(θ−i ) 6= ∅}.

The following condition guarantees that V ∗ is non-empty.
Proposition 5.14 If there exists a distribution over action profile µ∗ ∈ △A, and for all θ ∈ D̂,a
profile µθ ∈ △A such that for all i, k ∈ κ(θ−i ),
max ui (k, ai , µθ−i ) ≤ ui (k, µ∗ ),

ai ∈Ai

then V ∗ is non-empty.
Proof. It is suﬃcient to show that v := (ui(k, µ∗ ))i∈N,k∈K is in V ∗ . IC: The payoﬀ vector v can be
achieved by implementing the occupation measure µ∗ irrespective of the announcements, hence it
is incentive compatible. IR and JR: the condition on µθ implies that when the distribution over
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action proﬁle µθ is implemented, in all possible states a player cannot gain more than v even if he
unilaterally deviates or makes a report leading to an inconsistent report proﬁle. Thus, µθ can be
used to deter unilateral deviations or misreports, guaranteeing that v is individually and jointly
rational.

6



Reputations
It follows from the previous section that V ∗ is non-empty when players know their own payoﬀs,

and the incomplete information concerns one player’s payoﬀ only, so that the payoﬀs of all players
but one are commonly known. Formally, for every player i, ui (k, ·) = ui(θi , ·), and for all i 6= 1,
|Θi | = 1. This environment with one-sided incomplete information is the focus of a large literature
on “reputations,” starting with Fudenberg and Levine (1989), and is assumed throughout this
section. While there exists a large literature on reputation in two-player games, Fudenberg and
Kreps (1987) and Ghosh (2007) are, to the best of our knowledge, the only other papers considering
reputations when the informed player faces multiple opponents. In Hörner and Lovo (2009), it
was shown how results by Israeli (1999) for the set of undiscounted Nash equilibrium payoﬀs in
two-player games with such information structures could be applied with hardly any change to
the set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs as the discount factor tends to one. In this section, the
generalization of those results to N players is presented. Proofs are generalizations of those by
Israeli.
Fix one (payoﬀ) type of player 1, the rational type. The purpose of this section is to identify
how much the rational type is guaranteed to get in equilibrium, as the discount factor tends to
one, as a function of his other possible payoﬀ types. The rational type’s reward is denoted u1 ,
while his other possible payoﬀ types are denoted uk1 , k = 2, . . . , K. We ﬁx throughout the reward
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functions (u2 , . . . , uN ) of players i = 2, . . . , N. Given some reward function uk1 , ui , let uk1 , ui denote
the corresponding minmax payoﬀs val uk1 and val ui .
∗
Given any vector uK := (u21 , . . . , uK
is non-empty, let v1 (uK ) be the inﬁmum
1 ) such that V

of the payoﬀ of player 1’s rational type over V ∗ . We deﬁne the reputation payoff of player 1’s
rational type as
u∗1 :=

v1 (uK ).

sup
{uK :K≥2}

Observe that the rational type’s equilibrium payoﬀ must be at least equal to
min u1 (µ) such that uk1 (µ) ≥ uk1 , ui(µ) ≥ ui , ∀i, k ≥ 2.

µ∈△A

Indeed, if the state is k, the play speciﬁed by the equilibrium strategies must be an equilibrium
of the game with complete information in state k, and therefore this play must be such that all
players get at least their minmax payoﬀ in that state. Since player 1’s rational type can always
follow the strategy of player 1’s type k, he must receive at least as much as he would get from
following this play. Therefore, it must be that
u∗1

≥

sup
{uK :K≥2}



min u1 (µ) :

µ∈△A

uk1 (µ)

≥

uk1 , ui(µ)



≥ ui , ∀i, k ≥ 2 .

Focusing on K = 2, the dual problem is

sup

max

u21 {pi ≥0:i=1,...,N }

p1 u21 +

XN

i=2

pi ui such that p1 u21 +
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XN

i=2

pi u i ≤ u 1 .

Since the constraint must bind, the reputation payoﬀ is at least

sup

val (u1 −

{pi ≥0:i=2,...,N }

XN

i=2

pi (ui − ui 1)),

where 1 is a vector in R|A| with all entries equal to one. Note that this lower bound is always larger
than u1 (take (p2 , . . . , pN ) = 0). The following theorem shows that this lower bound is actually
achieved, and provides an alternative characterization of it. The proof of it can be found in the
supplemental material (Appendix F).
Theorem 6.1 The reputation payoff is equal to
u∗1 =

sup
{pi ≥0:i=2,...,N }

val (u1 −

XN

i=2

pi (ui − ui 1)) = sup

min

α1 ∈△A1 α−1 ∈Y (α1 )

u1 (α1 , α−1 ),

where Y (α1 ) := {α−1 ∈ △A−1 : ui (α1 , α−1 ) ≥ ui , ∀i = 2, . . . , N}. The reputation payoff is
achieved if K = N and uk1 = −uk , ∀k = 2, . . . , N:
u∗1 = v1 (−u2 , . . . , −uN ).6
As is clear from the alternative characterization, the reputation payoﬀ is lower than the usual
Stackelberg payoff
sup

min

α1 ∈△A1 α−1 ∈B(α1 )

u1 (α1 , α−1 ),

where B(α1 ) is the set of Nash equilibria in the one-shot game between players i = 2, . . . , N, given
α1 . A Stackelberg sequence is any sequence {an1 }n∈N achieving the supremum.
6

Note that zero-sum games violate the interiority assumption. However, as in Hörner and Lovo (2009, online
appendix), it is straightforward to approach this reputation payoff by considering payoff matrices satisfying the
interiority assumption, which are arbitrarily close to the zero-sum game.
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A game has conflicting interest if, for some Stackelberg sequence {an1 }n∈N , all Nash equilibria
in B(an1 ) yield players i 6= 1 exactly their minmax payoﬀ, for all n ∈ N. It follows immediately
from the theorem that player 1’s rational type can secure the Stackelberg payoﬀ in all games of
conﬂicting interest.

7

Conclusion
This paper provides a characterization of the set of belief-free equilibrium payoﬀs in games

with perfect monitoring. Further, necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the information structure
are identiﬁed for non-emptiness of this set.
As discussed, belief-free equilibria have appealing properties. However, because they do not
rely on beliefs, they are silent on how beliefs actually shape play. Game theory has played an
important role in providing insights about when and how agents learn, whether it is advantageous
to hide or disclose private information, or how fast to reveal it. This provides a useful perspective
on the existence or non-existence results of belief-free equilibria. In an environment in which such
equilibria do not exist, play must necessarily reﬂect beliefs, and this opens the door for robust
ﬁndings on this dependence. This is the case, for instance, in zero-sum games with incomplete
information on one-side, in which the speed of convergence can be determined (Mertens, 1998).
On the other hand, if one attempts to address such issues in an environment in which belief-free
equilibria exist, it becomes more important to stress why the choice of the particular equilibrium
is compelling. This could be, for instance, because the equilibrium that is considered is eﬃcient
(see, however, the folk theorems established by Fudenberg and Yamamoto, 1999b). Alternatively,
one must invoke considerations that are external to the repeated game, such as those involving
measures of complexity, for instance.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 4.1 with a
communication device
Player i’s message set is Θi . The timing in a given period is as follows.
1. A draw from the uniform distribution on [0, 1] is publicly observed;
2. Actions are simultaneously chosen;
3. Messages are simultaneously chosen.
As far as messages go, players always report their types truthfully in equilibrium. We refer to
the event in which one player does not report truthfully as misreporting by this player. A type
proﬁle is inconsistent if κ(θ) = ∅, and it is consistent otherwise.
As far as actions go, equilibrium play can be divided into three phases: regular phases, penitence
phases and punishment phases. Regular and penitence phases last one period. Punishment phases
last T period, for some T ∈ N to be deﬁned.
In regular and penitence phases, players use an action proﬁle that is coordinated by the public
randomization device. In a punishment phase, a player is minmaxed by his opponents, in the
sense of Blackwell described above.
To ensure that the strategy proﬁle is belief-free, we must make sure that the punished player is
playing the same way independently of the state, and that the punishing players have incentives to
carry out the minmax strategy, even when this strategy calls for mixed actions. This complicates
somewhat the description of the equilibrium strategies.
There are two kinds of deviations. The punishment phase is triggered if a player deviates in
his choice of an action (“deviation in action”), and deters him from making such deviations. The
penitence phase is triggered only if an inconsistent type proﬁle is observed, and deters players from
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misreporting (“deviation in report”) to induce an inconsistent type proﬁle. Incentive compatibility
of payoﬀs deters players from misreporting to induce a false but consistent type proﬁle.
The equilibrium path consists of an inﬁnite repetition of the regular phases.
Regular phases are denoted Rθ (ε), with κ (θ) 6= ∅ and ε ∈ RN |κ(θ)| . Penitence phases are
denoted E θ (ε), where κ (θ) = ∅ and ε ∈ RN K . Punishment phases are denoted P θ−i , with
κ (θ−i ) 6= ∅.

Actions and Messages
(i) Regular phase: In a regular phase, actions are determined by the outcome of the public
randomization device. In phase Rθ (ε), action proﬁles are selected according to a probability
distribution µθ (ε) in such a way that
ui (k, µθ (ε)) = vik + εi
for k ∈ κ (θi , θ−i ), and
ui (k, µθi ,θ−i (ε)) > ui (k, µθi′ ,θ−i (ε′ ))

(2)

for all i, all εi ∈ [−ε, ε], all ε′i ∈ [−ε, ε], all (θi , θ−i ) and (θi′ , θ−i ) such that κ (θi , θ−i ) 6= ∅ and
κ (θi′ , θ−i ) 6= ∅.

Such a distribution exists for suﬃciently small ε > 0 given that v ∈ int V ∗ is

strictly incentive compatible.
At the end of a regular phase, all players truthfully report their types.
(ii) Penitence phase: In a penitence phase, actions are determined by the outcome of the public
randomization device. Consider penitence phase E θ (ε). Recall that κ (θ) = ∅. We distinguish
two cases.
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′
′
1. θ ∈ D: by deﬁnition, there exist a set Ωθ of players and types (i, θi ) such that κ θi , θ−i =
6 ∅.

Action proﬁles are selected according to a probability distribution µθ (ε) in such a way that
ui (k, µθ (ε)) < vik + εi

(3)


′
′
for all (i, θi ) ∈ Ωθ , k ∈ κ θi , θ−i and all εi ∈ [−ε, ε]. Such a distribution exists for suﬃciently

small ε > 0 given that v ∈ int V ∗ satisﬁes (JR) with strict inequality.

2. θ ∈
/ D (i.e., at least two players misreported): Players use some ﬁxed, but arbitrary action
proﬁle a := {ai }N
i=1 ∈ A.
At the end of a penitence phase, all players truthfully report their types.
θ

(iii) Punishment phase: A punishment phase lasts T periods. In P θ−i , players −i use sb−i−i .
a

For some action ai ∈ Ai , let si i denote the strategy of playing ai after all histories within the
a

punishment phase.7 Player i plays si i throughout the phase.
We pick T ∈ N, δ < 1 and ε > 0 such that, for all δ > δ and all k ∈ κ (θ−i ), player i’s average
discounted payoﬀ over the T periods is no larger than vik − 2ε. This is possible since v satisﬁes
(IR) with strict inequality.
At the end of each period of a punishment phase, all players truthfully report their types.
Initial phase
All players truthfully report their types at the beginning of the game. Given report proﬁle θ,
the initial phase is Rθ (0).
7

To avoid introducing additional notation, we have used here the same notation (i.e., ai ) than in one of the
specifications for the penitence phase. It is irrelevant whether these are the same actions or not.
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Transitions
(i) From a regular phase Rθ (ε): Let a denote the (pure) action proﬁle determined by the
public randomization device, a′ the realized action proﬁle, and θ′ the report of types at the end
of the phase.
1. (Unilateral deviation) a′i 6= ai for some i ∈ N and a′−i = a−i :
′

′
(a) κ(θ−i
) 6= ∅: the next phase is P θ−i ;
′

′
(b) κ(θ−i
) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′), where ε′j = −ε if (j, θj′′ ) ∈ Ωθ′ for some θj′′ ∈ Θj ,

and ε′j = εj otherwise.
2. (Multilateral deviations, or no deviation) a′i 6= ai for some i ∈ N and a′−i 6= a−i , or a′ = a:
(a) κ(θ′ ) 6= ∅:
′

i. θ′ = (θ−i , θi′ ) for some i ∈ N and θi′ 6= θi : the next phase is Rθ (−ε, ε−i );
ii. otherwise, the next phase is Rθ (ε);
′

(b) κ(θ′ ) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′ ), where ε′i = −ε if (i, θi′′ ) ∈ Ωθ′ for some θi′′ ∈ Θi ,
and ε′i = εi otherwise.

(ii) From a penitence phase E θ (ε): Let a denote the (pure) action proﬁle determined by the
public randomization device, a′ the realized action proﬁle, and θ′ the report of types at the end
of the phase.
1. (Unilateral deviations) a′i 6= ai for some i ∈ N and a′−i = a−i :
′

′
(a) κ(θ−i
) 6= ∅: the next phase is P θ−i ;
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′

′
(b) κ(θ−i
) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′), where ε′j = −ε if (j, θj′′ ) ∈ Ωθ′ for some θj′′ ∈ Θj ,

and ε′j = εj otherwise.
2. (Multilateral deviations, or no deviation) a′i 6= ai for some i ∈ N and a′−i 6= a−i , or a′ = a:
(a) κ(θ′ ) 6= ∅: the next phase is Rθ (ε);
′

(b) κ(θ′ ) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′ ), where ε′i = −ε if (i, θi′′ ) ∈ Ωθ′ for some θi′′ ∈ Θi ,
and ε′i = εi otherwise.

(iii) From a punishment phase P θ−i : The punishment phase lasts T periods. Let hT denote an
arbitrary history of length T . Let θ′ denote the reported type proﬁle in the T -th period. Then
′

1. (a) κ(θ′ ) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′ ), where ε′i = −ε if (i, θi′′ ) ∈ Ωθ′ for some θi′′ ∈ Θi ,
and ε′i = εi otherwise;
′

(b) κ(θ′ ) 6= ∅: the next phase is Rθ (εi(h; P θ−i ), ε−i(h; P θ−i )), with εj (h; P θ−i ) ∈ [−ε̄, ε̄], all
j. The values εj (h; P θ−i ) are such that:
a

(4) for all k ∈ κ (θ′ ), and conditional on any history h ∈ H T , playing si i in the punishθ

ment phase is an optimal continuation strategy for player i, given sb−i−i ; further, if
′
θ−i
= θ−i , player i’s expected payoﬀ, evaluated at the beginning of the punishment
a

θ

phase, from playing si i given sb−i−i (and given that θ′ is truthfully reported), is equal


to 1 − δ T (vik − 2ε) + δ T vik − ε , for all k ∈ κ (θ′ ). That this is possible follows
from inequality (6) below.

θ

(5) for all k ∈ κ (θ′ ), and conditional on any history h ∈ H T , playing b
sj −i is an optimal

a
θ
θ−i
sj −i
continuation strategy for player j 6= i, given (si i , (b
′ )j ′ 6=j ); In addition εj ·; P
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is in [ε/3, ε] if θj′ = θj , and it is in [−ε, −ε/3] otherwise (recall that h speciﬁes θ′ ).
That this is possible follows from inequality (6) below.
It is clear that these strategies do not depend on players’ beliefs, but only on past history.

Optimality Verification
Given v ∈ int V ∗ , we now pick ε > 0 small to ensure that the probability distributions introduced above exist, and δ, and T such that the payoﬀ of a punished player is low enough, as
speciﬁed above for the punishment phase (see ‘Actions and Messages’). In addition, we take these
values to satisfy




− 1 − δ T M + δ T vjk + ε/3 > 1 − δ T M + δ T vjk − ε/3 ,



− (1 − δ) M + δ vjk − ε > (1 − δ) M + δ 1 − δ T (vjk − 2ε) + δ T vjk − ε .

(6)
(7)

Given v and ε > 0, these are all satisﬁed as δ T → 1 and T → ∞, so they are also satisﬁed for
values of T and δ that are large enough. Inequality (6) guarantees that a variation of 2ε̄/3 in
continuation payoﬀs at the end of a punishment phase dominates any gains/losses that could be
incurred during such a phase. Inequality (7) guarantees that the punishment phase is long enough
to deter deviations in action.
Regular Phase: Rθ (ε) and penitence phases E θ (ε): Let a denote the (pure) action proﬁle
determined by the public randomization device, a′ the realized action proﬁle, and θ′ the report of
types at the end of the phase.
Actions: Suppose that a′ = (a−i , a′i ) for some i and a′i 6= ai , i.e., player i unilaterally deviates
from the prescribed action proﬁle. Then, provided players −i truthfully report, the punishment
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′

phase P θ−i starts. The maximum that player i can obtain by deviating is the right-hand side of
(7), while by conforming to the prescribed action he gets at least as much as the left-hand side of
(7).
Messages: let θi be player i’s type. We distinguish two cases.
1. Either no or more than one player deviated in action:
If player i reports truthfully, he gets at least vik − ε, where k ∈ κ (θ′ ). If he misreports, we
further distinguish two cases:
′

(a) κ (θ′ ) = ∅: assuming the other players report truthfully, the next phase is E θ (ε′ ) with

′
ε′i = −ε. So player i’s payoﬀ is at most maxθi′ 6=θi (1 − δ) ui(k, µθi′ ,θ−i
(ε)) + δ vik − ε ,
which is less than vik − ε, because of (3).




′ (ε)
(b) κ (θ′ ) 6= ∅: Player i gets at most maxθi′ 6=θi (1 − δ) ui k, µθi′ ,θ−i
+ δ vik − ε , which

is less than vik − ε , because of (2).
2. a′ = (a−j , a′j ) for some j and a′j 6= aj (i.e., player j deviated in action):
Player j’s report is irrelevant and he can as well report truthfully.


If player i 6= j reports truthfully his type, he gets at least − 1 − δ T M + δ T vik + ε/3 . If
he misreports, there are two cases:

′

(a) κ (θ′ ) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′ ) with ε′i = −ε, so his payoﬀ is smaller than




(1 − δ) M +δ vik − ε < 1 − δ T M +δ T vik − ε/3 , which is less than − 1 − δ T M +

δ T vjk + ε/3 because of (6).



(b) κ (θi′ , θ−i ) 6= ∅: Player i gets at most 1 − δ T M + δ T vik − ε/3 (assuming he reports


truthfully at the end), which is less than − 1 − δ T M + δ T vik + ε/3 because of (6).
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Punishment phase P θ−i : Let θ′ denote the reported type proﬁle in the T -th period.
Actions: We consider ﬁrst player i, then Player j 6= i.

1. Player i: as mentioned, inequality (6) guarantees that we can specify εi h; P θ−i such that
a

θ

si i is optimal after every history in the punishment phase, given sbj6−i
=i .


2. Player j 6= i: similarly, inequality (6) guarantees that we can specify εj h; P θ−i such that
θ

θ

sbj −i is optimal after every history in the punishment phase, given sbj −i
′ 6=i,j .

Messages: The only payoﬀ relevant message is the one at the end of the punishment phase.
Let θ′ denote the reported type proﬁle in the T -th period. If player i ∈ N reports truthfully his
type, he gets at least vik − ε. If he misreports, we distinguish two cases:
′

1. κ (θ′ ) = ∅: the next phase is E θ (ε′ ) with ε′i = −ε, so player i’s payoﬀ is at most

′
(ε)) + δ vik − ε , which is less than vik − ε because of (3).
maxθi′ 6=θi (1 − δ) ui(k, µθi′ ,θ−i

′
(ε)) + δ vik − ε , which is less
2. κ (θ′ ) 6= ∅ : player i gets at most maxθi′ 6=θi (1 − δ) ui (k, µθi′ ,θ−i
than vik − ε because of (2).



Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 5.3
Suﬃciency is outlined in the Section 5. For the necessity part, assume that there are two states
k, ℓ such at most players 1 and 2 distinguish these two states. Consider the following example,
due to Renault (2001). There are three players 1, 2, 3, and we consider only the states k, ℓ. Other
players have no inﬂuence on rewards, and rewards in other states do not depend on actions.
The payoﬀ matrix in state k is the following:
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L

R

L

R

T

1, 1, 0

1, 1, 0

T

0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1

B

1, 1, 0

1, 1, 0

B

0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1

W

E

The payoﬀ matrix in state ℓ is:
L

R

L

R

T

0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1

T

1, 1, 0

1, 1, 0

B

0, 0, 1 0, 0, 1

B

1, 1, 0

1, 1, 0

W

E

First, assume that only player 1 knows the state and assume that V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty. The
IR condition for player 3 implies that he plays E in state k and W in state ℓ. Since the preference
ordering of player 1 is the opposite of the one of player 3, this violates the IC condition.
Assume now that players 1 and 2 know the state. Suppose that there exists a payoﬀ vector in
V ∗ (I, u). If players 1 and 2 both announce k, individual rationality implies that player 3 plays
E. The payoﬀ vector in state k is thus (0, 0, 1). Similarly, if players 1 and 2 announce ℓ, player 3
plays W and the payoﬀ vector in state ℓ is (0, 0, 1).
Now, suppose that player 1 announces k and player 2 announces ℓ: either the true state is k
and player 2 is misreporting or the true state is ℓ and player 1 is misreporting. The JR condition
implies that there exists a distribution of action proﬁles α such that u1 (ℓ, α) ≤ 0 and u2 (k, α) ≤ 0.
This is impossible since for each action proﬁle a, u1 (ℓ, a) + u2(k, a) = 1.

Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 5.7
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Necessity
We prove that if an information structure has a single majority component and is neither LWE
nor has the all-or-nothing property, then there is a reward function (which satisﬁes KOP) such
that V ∗ is empty. First observe that it is suﬃcient to focus on four information structures.
Proposition 7.1 If an information structure has a single majority component and is neither
LWE nor has the all-or-nothing property, then there there is a subset of three states such that the
restriction of I to this subset is of one of the following four types

1
2

k1

k2

k3

k1

∗

∗

∗

k2

∗

k1

k2

k3

1

k1

∗

∗

2

∗

k2

3

k1

k2

k1

k2

k3

1

k1

∗

∗

∗

2

∗

k2

∗

k3

3

k1

∗

∗

A
B

k1

k2

k3

1 k1

∗

∗

2

∗

k2

∗

3 k1

∗

∗

4

k2

∗

∗

C
D

where the entries are the types, or signals, of the players and it is understood that other players
have no information on those states.
The proof is relegated to supplemental material (Appendix G).
Counter-examples
For each information structure, we present a counter-example, i.e. a reward function for which
V ∗ (u, I) = ∅.
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A: a two-sided battle of the sexes We start by a counter-example due to Koren (1992),
see also Hörner and Lovo (2009). There are three states k, k ′ , k ′′ . The information of player 1
is I1 (k) = {k, k ′′ }, I1 (k ′ ) = {k ′ }. The information of player 2 is I2 (k) = {k, k ′ }, I2 (k ′′ ) = {k ′′ }.
Player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns.
L

R

L

R

L

R

T

3, 1 0, 0

T

3, 0

0, 1

T

1, 1

1, 0

B

0, 0 1, 3

B

0, 0

1, 1

B

0, 0

0, 3

state k

state k ′′

state k ′

The proof that V ∗ = ∅ for this game is in Hörner and Lovo (2009). The main argument is the
following. In state k ′ , player 1 has a dominant strategy, and individual rationality requires T to
be played with frequency 1 in that state. Now, in state k, player 1 may claim that the state is
k ′ . Incentive compatibility requires thus (T, L) to be played with frequency at least 3/4 in state
k. A symmetric argument for player 2 shows that (B, R) must be played with frequency at least
3/4 in state k. These two requirements are mutually incompatible.
B: Adding a fully informed player Consider example 5.5. This corresponds to the previous
game with the addition of a third player, player 3, who knows the state.
C: Adding a partially informed player Consider the game of case A again, and assume that
there is a player 3 who has the same information as player 2. The payoﬀ of player 3 does not
depend on the state and is:
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L

R

T

3

3−ε

B

3

0

u3
In this game, V ∗ is empty. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a point v in V ∗ .
Individual rationality of players 1 and 2 implies that in state k ′ , T is played with frequency 1, and
(T, R) with frequency no more than 1/4. Then, since player 1 is the only player to distinguish k
and k ′ , incentive compatibility requires that the payoﬀ v1k of player 1 in state k satisﬁes: v1k ≥ 3× 34 .
Since the sum of players 1 and 2’s payoﬀs in state k is at most 4, this implies v2k ≤ 47 . Individual
rationality of players 1 and 2 also implies that in state k ′′ , R is played with frequency 1, and (T, R)
with frequency no more than 1/4. This implies that the payoﬀ of player 3 in state k ′′ is such that:
′′

v3k ≤ (3 − ε)/4.
Consider now the following inconsistent reports: player 2 claims that the state is k ′′ and
player 3 claims that the state is k. Joint rationality requires that there exists a distribution α
′′

′′

of action proﬁles such that v2k ≥ uk2 (α) and v3k ≥ u3 (α). This is impossible, because v2k + v3k ≤
7/4 + (3 − ε)/4 < 3 − ε for ε small and since for every action proﬁle, uk2 + u3 ≥ 3 − ε.
D: Adding two partially informed player Consider once again the game of case A, and
assume that there is a third player, player 3, who has the same information as player 2, and a
fourth player, player 4, who has the same information as player 1. The payoﬀ of player 3 is as in
case C. The payoﬀ of player 4 does not depend on the state and is:
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L

R

T

0

3−ε

B

3

3

u4
In this game, V ∗ is empty. Assume for the sake of contradiction that there is a point v in
V ∗ . As in the previous example, individual rationality of players 1 and 2 in state k ′′ implies
′′

v3k ≤ (3 − ε)/4. Consider again the inconsistent reports in which player 2 claims that the state is
k ′′ , while player 3 claims that the state is k. Since for every action proﬁle uk2 + u3 ≥ 3 − ε, joint
′′

rationality implies v2k + v3k ≥ 3 − ε and thus v2k ≥ (3 − ε)3/4.
By a symmetric argument, considering the inconsistent reports in which player 1 claims that
the state is k ′ and player 4 claims that the state is k, we ﬁnd v1k ≥ (3 − ε)3/4. This implies that
v1k + v2k ≥ (3 − ε)3/2 > 4 for small ε, which is impossible.
The following Proposition show that an information structure with a single majority component, that is neither LWE nor has the all-or-nothing property is necessary of one of type A, B, C
or D.

LWE is sufficient
In this part we show that if the information structure is locally weakly embedded, then
V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ SI . Note that if there is a single majority component, LWE implies that there
exists two players 1,2 and a partition of the set of states K = K1 ∪ K2 such that:
• Il (k) = K for each k and each l 6= 1, 2.
• I1 (k) = {k} for each k ∈ K1 .
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• I2 (k) = {k} for each k ∈ K2 .
We ﬁrst prove the result assuming K1 = K, i.e. player 1 is fully informed at each state.
Proposition 7.2 Consider an information structure such that: player 1 knows the state and
players 3, . . . , n have no information (i.e. ∀k, I1 (k) = {k}, I3 (k) = · · · = IN (k) = K). Then
V ∗ (I, u) 6= ∅, ∀u ∈ SI .
Proof. Denote by ui the minmax level of player i = 3, . . . , N, uk1 the minmax level of player 1 in
state k and uθ2 , the minmax level of player 2 of type θ. For each type θ of player 2, consider the
set Aθ of mixed actions proﬁles α such that:
• For each i = 3, . . . , N,
∀a2 ∈ A2 , ui (α1 , a2 , α3 , . . . , αN ) ≥ ui .
• α2 is a best-reply of player 2 of type θ to (α1 , α3 , . . . , αN )
The set Aθ is clearly compact.
Claim 7.3 Aθ is non-empty.
Proof. We ﬁx α1 . For i ≥ 3 consider the correspondence Fi (α1 , ·) : ×j ∈{1,2,i}
△Aj → △Ai deﬁned
/
by:
Fi (α1 , α−1−2−i ) = {αi : ∀a2 , ui(α1 , a2 , αi , α−1−2−i ) ≥ ui }
This correspondence is convex and compact valued. Let us prove that this is also non-empty
valued. For a given α−1−2−i , player i has a mixed action that yields a payoﬀ no less than:

max min ui (α1 , a2 , αi , α−1−2−i ) = min max ui (α1 , α2 , ai , α−1−2−i )
αi

a2

α2
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ai

where the equality follows from the minmax theorem. Now, minα2 maxai ui(α1 , α2 , ai , α−1−2−i ) ≥
ui , and Fi (α1 , α−1−2−i ) is non-empty.
Let us denote BR2,θ the best-reply correspondence of player 2 of type θ and BR1,f is the
best-reply correspondence of player 1 when his payoﬀ function is f : A → R. Consider the
correspondence Φf,θ from ×i △Ai to itself deﬁned as follows:

Φf,θ (α) = {β : β1 ∈ BR1,f (α−1 ), β2 ∈ BR2,θ (α−2 ), ∀i ≥ 3, βi ∈ Fi (α1 , α−1−2−i )}
Φf,θ has non-empty, convex and compact values and it is straightforward to check that it has a
closed graph. It admits thus a ﬁxed point ᾱ by Kakutani’s ﬁxed point theorem. Clearly, ᾱ is in
Aθ . Note that this proﬁle has the additional property to be on the best-reply graph of player 1.
We thus have some degrees of freedom as we can choose any payoﬀ function for player 1. This
property is used later on. This ends the proof of the Claim.
Note that this proves Lemma 5.8 by considering the special case where player 1 has a single
action.

Let αk be a mixed action proﬁle that maximizes u1 (k, α) over α ∈ AI2(k) . We claim that the
payoﬀ vector:
(u1 (k, αk ), u2(I2 (k), αk ), u3(αk ), . . . , uN (αk ))
is in V ∗ . To phrase this deﬁnition, the informed player announces an action proﬁle for all players
but player 2, who takes a best-reply. Player 1 may choose the proﬁle as she wishes, provided that
it secures the minmax level of players 3, . . . , N, irrespective of the action of player 2.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 7.2, the constraints deﬁning V ∗ are the following:
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• Individual rationality for player 1.
For each θ and each q ∈ △θ,
X

k∈θ

qk u1 (k, αk ) ≥ min max
α−1

α1

X

k∈θ

qk u1 (k, α1 , α−1 )

• Individual rationality for players 2, 3, . . . , n.
I (k)

For each k, u2 (I2 (k), αk ) ≥ u22

, for each i ≥ 3, ui(αk ) ≥ ui .

• Incentive compatibility for player 1.
′

For each k, k ′ such that I2 (k) = I2 (k ′ ), u1 (k, αk ) ≥ u1 (k, αk ).
• Joint rationality for players 1 and 2.
′

′

k
For each announcement (k ′ , θ) such that θ 6= I2 (k ′ ), set αk ,θ = (α−2
, α2k ,θ ), where α2k ,θ
′

′

′

is a best-reply of player 2 of type θ to αk . The true state is either k ′ (and player 2 is
misreporting) or k ∈ θ (in which case player 1 is misreporting). The following must hold:
′

′

′

u1 (k, αk ) ≥ u1 (k, αk ,θ ) for k ∈ θ, and u2 (I2 (k ′ ), αk ) ≥ u2 (I2 (k ′ ), αk ,θ ).
Let us check all these points.
Individual rationality for player 1. Fix θ and q ∈ △θ. It follows from our construction that:
X

k∈θ

qk u1 (k, αk ) =

X

k∈θ

qk max u1 (k, α) ≥ max

Let ᾱ be a ﬁxed point of Φf,θ where f is chosen to be

max

α∈Aθ

X

k∈θ

qk u1 (k, α) ≥

X

k∈θ

α∈Aθ

α∈Aθ

P

k∈θ

k∈θ qk u1 (k, ·).

qk u1 (k, ᾱ) = max
α1
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X

X

k∈θ

qk u1 (k, α)

We get:

qk u1 (k, α1 , ᾱ−1 )

where the last equality holds since ᾱ is on the graph of BR1,f . The right-hand-side is no less than
P
minα−1 maxα1 k∈θ qk u1 (k, α1 , α−1 ).
Individual rationality for players 2, 3, . . . , N. Individual rationality for players 3, . . . , n holds by
construction of Aθ . Individual rationality for player 2 holds since she plays a best-reply to some
mixed action proﬁle.
Incentive compatibility for player 1.

Suppose that the true state is k and let θ = I2 (k). Player

1 gets the payoﬀ maxα∈Aθ u1 (k, α). If player 1 pretends that the state is k ′ with I2 (k ′ ) = θ, the
′

induced action proﬁle αk also belongs to Aθ , and the resulting payoﬀ for player 1 is at most
maxα∈Aθ u1 (k, α).
Joint rationality. Suppose as above, that the true state is k ∈ θ, but player 1 pretends that the
true state is k ′ with θ′ = I2 (k ′ ) 6= θ. Still, since the action of player 2 his dictated by her true
type θ, so the induced action proﬁle belongs to Aθ . Thus player 1 does not increase her payoﬀ by
this deviation.
Suppose now that the true state is k ′ but player 2 pretends that her type is θ. Players other
′

′

k
k
than 2 play α−2
and the best-reply of player 2 of type θ′ is α−2
by construction. Player 2 has thus

no incentive to misreport. This ends the proof of the proposition.



Now, let us take up the general LWE case where there is a partition of the set of states
K = K1 ∪ K2 such that: Il (k) = K for each k and each l 6= 1, 2, I1 (k) = {k} for each k ∈ K1 ,
I2 (k) = {k} for each k ∈ K2 .
Proposition 7.4 Under KOP, then V ∗ (I, u) is non-empty for the above information structure.
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Proof. Let take {K1 , K2 } be the partition of K such that K1 is the largest subset of K satisfying
I1 (k) = {k} for each k ∈ K1 . Let L := {L1 , . . . , LM } be the partition over K2 that is induced by
player 1 information. Then we have,
• ∪m Lm = K2
• If k, k ′ ∈ Lm , then I1 (k) = I1 (k ′ )
• If k, k ′ ∈ Lm , then u1 (k, α) = u1 (k ′ , α)
• ∀Lm ∈ L, if k ∈ Lm , then there exists k ′ 6= k, k ′ ∈ Lm
Consider ﬁrst the game ΓK1 obtained by eliminating the states in K2 . The only possible states
for this game are those in K1 and player 1 is the best informed player. This game has a non-empty
V ∗ from Proposition 7.2. Consider the above construction for this restricted game and denote αik ,
i = 1, . . . , N, k ∈ K1 player i’s corresponding mixed action in state k. Note that αik , i 6= 2 are such
that when all players i 6= 2 play αik , then player j ≥ 3 payoﬀ is individually rational independently
of player 2’s strategy.
Consider now ΓK2 deﬁned as the game where the only possible states are those in K2 and
the payoﬀ function of player 2 in state l ∈ K2 is û2 (l, α) := −u1 (l, α) while the payoﬀ functions
of all the other players are as in the original game. This is a game of known-own payoﬀ where
player 1 knows at least as much as player 2, i.e. player 1 is fully informed. Let αil , i = 1, . . . , N,
l ∈ K2 be player i’s mixed action obtained by using the previous construction in ΓK2 (player 1
announcing all players but player 2 stage game strategies and player 2 best replying). Note that
′

if l, l′ ∈ Lm ⊆ K2 , then αil = αil . Also for this game αil , i 6= 2 are such that when all players i 6= 2
play αil , then player j ≥ 3 payoﬀ is individually rational independently of player 2 strategy. In
addition player 1 incentive compatibility constraint implies that
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min u1
α2

l
l, α−2
, α2



≥ min u1
α2



l′
l, α−2
, α2



for any pair l, l′ ∈ K2 . Note also that for any l ∈ K2


k
l
max min u1 l, α−2
, α2 ≤ min u1 l, α−2
, α2
k∈K1 α2

α2

k
for some k ∈ K1
Otherwise, in game ΓK2 , player 1 would have chosen for state l a strategy α−2
l
instead of α−2
.

Take a state k ∈ K and a strategy proﬁle α−2 for all players but 2 and choose

β2k (α−2 ) ∈ arg min u1 (k, α−2 , α2 ) ,
α2

br2k (α−2 ) ∈ arg max u2 (k, α−2 , α2 ) ,
α2

Consider the following construction:
• Step 1: Types announcement. Players 1 and 2 announce their types. Let θ1 and θ2 be their
announcement.
• Step 2.a: Regular Play. If the there is no contradiction in player 1 and 2 announcements,
then
k
and and player
– If the state k ∈ K1 is announced, then players other than 2 play α−2

2 takes a best reply.
l
– If the state l ∈ K2 is announced , then players other than 2 play α−2
and player 2

takes a best reply.
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• Step 2.b: Penitence Play. If there is a contradicting announcement, then
– If the announcement is θ1 = k ∈ K1 and θ2 = l ∈ K2 , then players other than 2 play
k
k
α−2
and player 2 plays β2l (α−2
).

– If the announcement is θ1 = Lm ∈ L and θ2 = l′ ∈
/ Lm , then players other than 2 play
′

l
l
α−2
, with l ∈ Lm , and player 2 plays β2l (α−2
).
l
– If the announcement is θ1 = Lm ∈ L and θ2 ∈ K1 , then players other than 2 play α−2

with l ∈ Lm , and player 2 takes a best-reply for the announced type θ2 .
The interpretation is the following. As in the proof of Proposition 7.2, player 1 chooses an action
proﬁle α2 that secures the minmax levels of the uninformed players (irrespective of the action of
player 2), and player 2 takes a best-reply. On K1 , the construction is essentially unchanged. On
K2 , player 1 makes this choice, expecting player 2 to be adversarial (û2 (l, α) := −u1 (l, α)). If
player 1 misreports, player 2 makes this expectation happen and minimizes the payoﬀ of player 1.
Otherwise, she takes a best reply according to her actual payoﬀ function. This gives an incentive
to player 1, who prefers player 2 to take her best reply rather than punishing him.
Verification that the strategy define a payoff vector in V ∗
Individual rationality. Consider the payoﬀs from the regular play. The payoﬀ is clearly IR for
player i ≥ 3 from the constructuion. Player 2 payoﬀ is IR since she is best replying to the other
players strategies. In states k ∈ K1 , player 1’s IR follows from the construction of the equilibrium
of the game ΓK1 . In a state l ∈ K2 , player 1’s payoﬀ is at least as large as the one in the game
ΓK2 which is individually rational. I.e., for l ∈ K2 we have,


l
l
l
v1l = u1 l, α−2
, br2l (α−2
) ≥ min u1 l, α−2
, α2 ≥ ul1 .
α2
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Incentive compatibility. In states K1 , incentive compatibility for player 1 follows the equilibrium
Lm
)
of ΓK1 . For the states l which belong to some Lm ∈ L, player 2’s takes a best-reply to (α−2

which does not depend on l ∈ Lm , and incentive compatibility follows.
Joint Rationality. There are three possible types of contradicting announcement: First, θ1 = k ∈
K1 and θ2 = l ∈ K2 ; second θ1 = L′m ∈ L and θ2 = l ∈
/ Lm ; and third, θ1 = L′m ∈ L and θ2 ∈ K1 .
If the state is k ∈ K1 , player 2 has no incentive of announcing θ2 = l ∈ K2 as by doing so she
punishes player 1 instead of taking her best reply. That is,


k
k
k
k
u2 k, α−2
, β2l (α−2
) ≤ u2 k, α−2
, br2k (α−2
) = v2k .
Similarly if player 1 announces θ1 = k ∈ K when the state is l ∈ Lm ⊆ K2 , this triggers a
punishment by player 2 and player 1’s payoﬀ is at most,


k
k
k
max u1 l, α−2
, β2l (α−2
) = max min u1 l, α−2
, α2 ≤
k∈K1 α2

k∈K1



l
l
l
≤ min u1 l, α−2
, α2 ≤ u1 l, α−2
, br2l (α−2
) = v1l
α2

Consider now the announcement θ1 = Lm and θ2 = l′ ∈ K2 with l′ ∈
/ Lm . If the state is l ∈ Lm ,
then player 2 has no incentive to announce l′ as this would trigger a punishment yielding



l
l′
l
l
l
u2 l, α−2 , β2 (α−2 ) ≤ u2 l, α−2
, br2l (α−2
) = v2l .
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If the state is l′ ∈
/ Lm , then player 1 has no incentive to announce Lm as this would trigger a
punishment yielding at most


max u1 l
l∈K2

′

′
l
l
, α−2
, β2l (α−2
)




l
= max min u1 l′ , α−2
, α2 ≤
l∈K2

α2





′
l′
′
l′
l′
l′
≤ min u1 l′ , α−2
, α2 ≤ u1 l , α−2 , br2 (α−2 ) = v1l
α2

where the ﬁrst inequality follows form the IC constraint of player 1 in game ΓK2 .
Finally, consider the announcement θ1 ⊆ K2 and θ2 ⊆ K1 . This occurs for instance if the state
is k ∈ K1 and player 1 announces Lm ⊆ K2 . Let l ∈ Lm , then player 1’s payoﬀ in the induced
penitence play is


l
l
k
k
u1 k, α−2
) ≤ u1 k, α−2
, br2θ2 (α−2
, br2θ2 (α−2
) = v1k ,
l
otherwise, in game ΓK1 player 1 would have chosen strategies α−2
as the equilibrium strategies for

state k. Similarly, if the state l ∈ Lm and player 2 announces θ1 = K1 , then player 2 payoﬀ in the


l
l
l
l
penitence phase is u2 l, α−2
, br2θ2 (α−2
) ≤ u2 l, α−2
, br2l (α−2
) = v2l , since player 2 prefers to take

the best-reply according to her actual payoﬀ function.



Appendix D: Proof of Theorem 5.11
Suﬃciency: For each state k, ﬁx a vector v k that is individually rational in the complete

information game corresponding to state k, i.e., v k ≥ uk . We show that v := v k is in V ∗ . This

proﬁle is chosen to be individually rational. IC and JR: when there is no essential player, the

information held by players other than i is suﬃcient to reveal the state. Thus, player i has no
choice but to be inconsistent with the other players, or go along with the identiﬁcation of the
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state. The distribution corresponding to the bad outcome can be used to deter a player from
deviating.
Necessity: Consider the following game that has a bad outcome and where player 1 is essential
to identify the state. For this game, V ∗ (I, u) = ∅.
Example 7.5 (This example is adapted from Hörner and Lovo, 2009). There are two states k, k ′ ,
and two players. Player 1 is informed of the state, player 2 is not. The payoff matrix in states k
and k ′ are the following:
L

M

R

L

M

R

T

10, −4

1, 1

10, −4

T

0, 0

1, 1

10, −4

B

1, 1

0, 0

−1, −4

B

1, 1

10, −4

−1, −4

state k ′

state k

Action profile {B, R} is the bad outcome. Player 1 can guarantee a payoff of at least 3 in one
of the states by randomizing equally between U and D and player 2 can guarantee at least 0 in each
state. This implies that the equilibrium distribution over action profiles cannot assign probability
more than 1/5 to action profiles yielding −4 to player 2. In turn, this implies that player 1’s
payoff is at most 14/5 in each state, a contradiction.



Appendix E: Proof of Theorem 5.12
Necessity can be shown by considering a two-player two-sided game where both players are
essential. In this context a counter-example is found in Koren (1992) and in Hörner and Lovo
(2009). This example is also in appendix C (example A). To prove suﬃciency, consider a game with
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known-own payoﬀs and a bad outcome, and an information structure with at most one essential
player per state. Partition the set of states as

K = K 0 ∪ K 1 ∪ · · · ∪ KS ,

where for each k ∈ K0 , there is no essential player at k, and for each s = 1, . . . , S, there exists a
unique player is who is essential at states in Ks . That is,
a) for all k, k ′ in Ks , Iis (k) 6= Iis (k ′ ),
b) for all k, k ′ in Ks and all players j 6= is , Ij (k) = Ij (k ′ ),
c) for all k ∈ Ks , k ′ ∈
/ Ks , there exists j 6= is such that Ij (k) 6= Ij (k ′ ).
To construct one cell Ks of this partition, consider a state k such that some player i is essential at
this state. This means that I−i (k) 6= {k}. Set then Ks = I−i (k) and is = i. Property b) is clearly
satisﬁed. Property a) holds since I−i (k) ∩ Ii (k) = {k}. Property c) holds since if k ′ ∈
/ Ks = I−i (k),
there must exist j 6= is such that Ij (k) 6= Ij (k ′ ).
Choose, for each k ∈ K0 , an individually rational payoﬀ v k in state k. For each s = 1, . . . , S,
consider the game with incomplete information Γs where:
• It is common knowledge that the state belongs to Ks ,
• Player is knows the state and other players have no information.
Let Vs∗ be the set of IC, IR and JR payoﬀs of this game. The information structure of Γs is locally
weakly embedded. Thus, from Theorem 5.7, Vs∗ is non-empty. Let us choose a payoﬀ array in
this set, for each s. We construct the overall equilibrium as follows. Let players announce their
information:
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• If the announcements identify a state k ∈ K0 , v k is implemented.
• If after the announcements, the set Ks is common knowledge, the chosen equilibrium of Γs
is played.
• If the announcements are inconsistent, the bad outcome is played.
The induced payoﬀ array is individually rational. We argue now that no player has an incentive
to misreport. Player i who is not essential at state k has no other choice than letting the state be
revealed or being inconsistent with the other players. The bad outcome ensures that he weakly
prefers to tell the truth. Consider player is at some state k ∈ Ks . If he announces Iis (k ′ ) for
some k ′ ∈ Ks , the announcements are consistent. Each player is now aware that the true state
may be any k in Ks and the equilibrium of Γs can be played. If player is announces Iis (k ′ ) for
some k ′ ∈
/ Ks , property c) above says that this announcement is inconsistent with some other
player’s report. Player is has thus no other choice than letting Ks be revealed or inducing the bad
outcome. This provides a weak incentive to tell the truth.
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Appendix F: Proof of Theorem 6.1
Deﬁne
u′1 :=

sup

val (u1 −

{pi ≥0:i=2,...,N }

XN

i=2

pi (ui − ui 1)),

and
u′′1 := sup

min

α1 ∈△A1 α−1 ∈Y (α1 )

u1 (α1 , α−1 ).

We have already argued that u∗1 ≥ u′1 . Let us ﬁrst show that u′1 ≥ u′′1 . By deﬁnition, for all ε > 0,
there exists (p2 , . . . , pN ) ≥ 0 and α1 ∈ △A1 such that
u′1 − ε ≤ val (u1 −

XN

pi (ui − ui 1))
XN
pi (ui(α1 , α−1 ) − ui )}
≤ min{u1(α1 , α−1 ) −
i=2
α−1
XN
≤ min{u1(α1 , α−1 ) −
pi (ui(α1 , α−1 ) − ui 1) : α−1 ∈ Y (α1 )}
i=2

i=2

α−1

≤ min{u1(α1 , α−1 ) : α−1 ∈ Y (α1 )} ≤ u′′1 .
α−1

Conversely, for every ε > 0, there exists α1 ∈ △A1 such that minα−1 ∈Y (α1 ) u1 (α1 , α−1 ) ≥ u′′1 − ε.
|A

|

Therefore, ﬁxing α1 ∈ △A1 , for every α−1 ∈ R+ −1 ,


ui(α1 , α−1 ) − ui

X|A−1 |
a=1

α−1,a



≥ 0 ⇒ u1 (α1 , α−1 ) − (u′′1 − ε)

i6=1

X|A−1 |
a=1

|A

|

α−1,a ≥ 0.

By Farkas’ Lemma, there exists (p2 , . . . , pN ) ≥ 0 and a constant γ ∈ R+ −1 such that, for every
α−1 ∈ △A−1 ,
u1 (α1 , α−1 ) − u′′1 + ε =
≥

XN

i=2
XN

i=2

1

pi (ui (α1 , α−1 ) − ui ) + γ · α−1
pi (ui (α1 , α−1 ) − ui ).

Therefore,
u′1 + ε ≥ val (u1 −

XN

i=2

pi (ui − ui 1)) + ε ≥ u′′1 .

We now show that the bound is attained by uk1 = −uk , ∀k = 2, . . . , N. Given some equilibrium, let
µi ∈ △A be the occupation measure when player 1 is of type i (the rational type is type 1). Player
i’s individual rationality is equivalent to, for all i, ui (µi ) ≥ ui . Further, player 1’s individuality
rationality condition states that, for every p ∈ △{1, . . . , N},
p1 u1 (µ1 ) +

XN

i=2

pi (−ui (µi )) ≥ val (p1 u1 −

XN

i=2

pi ui ),

and therefore, for the choice pi = 1, pj = 0, all j 6= i, it follows that −ui (µi ) ≥ val (−ui ) = −ui .
Hence, ui (µi) = ui . Thus, we can rewrite the individual rationality condition as
u1 (µ1 ) ≥ val (u1 −

X N pi
(ui − ui 1)),
i=2 p1

i.e. u1 (µ1 ) ≥ u′1 . Incentive compatibility of (µi )i is obvious.
It remains to show that, for every choice of K and uK , there always exists an equilibrium in
which player 1’s rational type does not exceed u′1 . Pick any such game. Let
v1k := max {uk1 (µ) : u1(µ) ≤ u′1 , ui(µ) ≥ ui , ∀i ≥ 2},
µ∈△A

for all k = 1, . . . , K, with u11 = u1 . Since u′1 ≥ u1 , the folk theorem under complete information
ensures that the set on the right-hand side is non-empty, so that v1k is well-deﬁned. Clearly, the
action proﬁles αk are incentive compatible, and individually rational for all players i ≥ 2. It
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remains to show that it is incentive compatible for player 1, i.e., that for all p ∈ △{1, . . . , K},
XK

k=1

XK
pk uk1 ).
pk v1k ≥ val (
k=1

|A|

From the deﬁnition of v1k , it follows that for every k = 1, . . . , K and α ∈ R+ ,
ui (α) ≥ ui 1 · α, u′11 · α ≥ u1 (α) ⇒ v1k 1 · α ≥ uk1 (α).
By Farkas’ Lemma, for every k = 1, . . . , K, there exists γ k ≥ 0, λki ≥ 0 such that v1k 1 − uk1 ≤
P
k
γ k (u′1 1 − u1 ) + N
i=2 λi (ui − ui 1). Therefore, for all p ∈ △{1, . . . , K},
XK
XK
XK
XK
XN
val (
pk uk1 ) ≤
pk v1k −
pk γ k u′1 + val (
pk (γ k u1 −
λki (ui − ui 1))),
k=1

k=1

k=1

k=1

i=2

and so individual rationality for player 1 is satisﬁed if
XK

k=1

This is satisﬁed if

PK

k=1

XN
XK
λki (ui − ui 1))).
pk (γ k u1 −
pk γ k u′1 ≥ val (
i=2

k=1

pk γ k = 0, and if not, deﬁning
XK
XK
pk γ k ) ≥ 0,
λki pk )/(
νi := (
k=1

k=1

it is equivalent to
u′1 ≥ val (u1 −

XN

i=2

which is satisﬁed by deﬁnition of u′1 .

νi (ui − ui 1))),
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Appendix G: Proof of Proposition 7.1
Take an information structure I with a single majority component and say that player i is
trivial if Ii (k) = K for all k; player i is non-trivial otherwise.
Lemma 7.6 If there are at most two non-trivial players, then either I is LWE or there is a subset
of three states, such that the restriction of I to this subset is of type A.
Proof. Let 1, 2 be the two non-trivial players. If it holds for each k that I1 (k) ⊆ I2 (k) or
I2 (k) ⊆ I1 (k), then it is LWE. Otherwise there exists a state c such that the two sets I1 (c), I2 (c)
are not comparable. That is, there exists c′ and c′′ such that c′ ∈ I1 (c) \ I2 (c) and c′′ ∈ I2 (c) \ I1 (c).
The subset {c, c′, c′′ } is as required.



Proposition 7.7 If there are at least three non-trivial players, then either I has the all-or-nothing
property, or there is a subset of three states such that the restriction of I to this subset is of type
A, B, C or D.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the number of states. First, assume that there are only three
states. We denote by E the 3-state, 3-player, all-or-nothing information structure:
k1

k2

k3

1 k1

∗

∗

2

∗

k2

∗

3

∗

∗

k3

E
Lemma 7.8 A 3-state information structure which has only one majority component and which
is not LWE is A, B, C, D or E.
4

Proof. We prove this by enumeration.
First, because the information is not LWE, there must exist 2 players, say player 1, 2, and
three states, denoted k1 , k2 , k3, such that k1 ∈
/ I1 (k3 ), k2 ∈ I1 (k3 ), k2 ∈
/ I2 (k3 ), k1 ∈ I2 (k3 ). That
is, there must exist two players with non-comparable information at some state. We discuss the
information of the other players.
1. If all other players have no information, this is A. Otherwise:
2. If some player (player 3) is fully informed:

(a) If all other players have no information, this is B.
(b) If player 4 has some information, there is more than one majority component. For
instance, if player 4 has the same information as player 1, {k3 } is a majority component.
The reasoning is the same if player 4 has the same information as player 2. If the
information of player 4 is I4 (k3 ) 6= I4 (k1 ) = I4 (k2 ), we have the same conclusion: three
players (1, 3, 4) can distinguish k1 and k3 , and three players (2, 3, 4) can distinguish
k2 and k3 , so {k3 } is a majority component.
3. If no player is fully informed, but some player (player 3) is partially informed:
(a) If all other players have no information, this is C (up to a relabelling of players) or E.
(b) If player 4 also has partial information, all other players being uninformed, then it is
either D or there is more than one majority component. By symmetry we may assume
that players 3 and 4 have the same information. If it is the same as that of player 1
(resp. player 2) then {k3 } is a majority component. Otherwise, it is equivalent to E,
5

with a fourth player having the same information as 1, 2 or 3. In this case, one sees
easily that if the fourth player has the same information as (e.g.) player 1, {k1 } is a
majority component.
(c) Finally, if players 4 and 5 have partial information, there is more than one majority
component. There are three types of partial information and ﬁve players. Either
three of them have the same information and they can then distinguish states. Or the
information structure is the symmetric one, with two duplicated players, which leads
back to the previous case.



Let us do now the induction step. Take |K| > 3 and assume that the statement of Proposition
7.7 holds for |K| − 1. We consider an information structure with |K| states which has only one
majority component, at least three non-trivial players and which is not all-or-nothing.
Consider the relation on states deﬁned as aRb iﬀ ν(a, b) ≤ 2, and consider also the graph of
this relation. I has only one majority component means that this graph is connected. Note that
if we delete a state and all its adjacent edges, we obtain the graph of the relation on the restricted
set of states. Take now two states a and b such that there is a path in the graph from a to b with
maximal length among the paths in this graph. The graph obtained by suppressing a (resp. b) is
still connected. Indeed, any other point c is connected to b (resp. a) by a path that does not go
through a (resp. b), since otherwise, this would contradict the maximality of the path from a to
b. It follows that IK\{a} (resp. IK\{b} ) has only one majority component.
If IK\{a} or IK\{b} has at least three non-trivial players and is not symmetric, we are done by
induction. Assume otherwise.
Case A. Both IK\{a} and IK\{b} have at least three non-trivial players and are all-or-nothing.
First, the non-trivial players are the same for IK\{a} and IK\{b} . Indeed, let i be non-trivial for
6

IK\{a} . There exists k 6= a such that Ii (k) ∩ K \ {a} = {k}, so that Ii (k) ⊆ {k, a}. Then i cannot
be trivial in IK\{b} : for a trivial player Ii,K\{b} (k) contains at least three states. Let now 1, . . . , m
be these non-trivial players.
Let K1 , . . . , Km be the partition induced by IK\{a} on K \ {a}. Since IK\{b} is all-or-nothing,
there is a unique player, say player 1, such that I1,K\{b} (a) = {a}. So that I1 (a) ⊆ {a, b}.
• If b ∈ K1 , consider two other non-trivial players j, l and c′ ∈ Kl . By the all-or-nothing
property of IK\{a} and IK\{b} , one has a ∈ Ij (c′ ) and b ∈ Ij (c′ ). So that j does not
distinguish a and b. Now, either I1 (a) 6= I1 (b) and I is all-or-nothing, or I1 (a) = I1 (b) and
no player distinguishes a from b. In both cases, this is a contradiction.
• If b ∈
/ K1 , say b ∈ K2 . If I1 (a) = I1 (b), take c in K3 . By the all-or-nothing property of IK\{a}
and IK\{b} , c ∈ I1 (b) contradicting I1 (a) ⊆ {a, b}. Thus I1 (a) 6= I1 (b), that is I1 (a) = {a}
and by the all-or-nothing property of IK\{a} , I1 (b) = K \ (K1 ∪ {a}). By the all-or-nothing
property of IK\{a} , no player, except player 2, distinguishes b from other states in K2 and by
the all-or-nothing property of IK\{b} , no player, except player 1, distinguishes a from other
states in K1 . Thus I has the all-or-nothing property, a contradiction.

Case B. Both IK\{a} and IK\{b} have at most two non-trivial players. If IK\{a} or IK\{b} is
not LWE, we are done by lemma 7.6. Assume to the contrary that both are LWE. Then IK\{a,b}
is LWE as well which implies that the two non-trivial players are the same in IK\{a} and IK\{b} ,
say players 1 and 2. This implies that suppressing a or b changes some player, say player 3, from
non-trivial to trivial, which is not possible.
Case C. IK\{b} has at least three non-trivial players and has the all-or-nothing property and
IK\{a} has at most two non-trivial players. If IK\{a} is not LWE, we are done by lemma 7.6.
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Assume the contrary and consider IK\{a,b} . This is both all-or-nothing and LWE. This shows that
the non-trivial players from IK\{a} are non-trivial in IK\{b} as well, and that IK\{b} has exactly
three non-trivial players called henceforth 1, 2, 3. Suppressing a transforms, say player 1, from
non-trivial to trivial. So it must be the case that I1 (a) = {a} and I1 (k) = K \ {a} for k 6= a.
Let us choose now c 6= a such that I2 (c) = I2 (a) (which exists, because player 1 is the only
informed player at a) and assume that I3 (c) ⊂ I2 (c). Take d ∈ I2 (c) \ I3 (c). The information
structure on {a, c, d} is of type C or D, depending on whether player 3 can distinguish a from c
or not. If it is not the case that one can choose such a d (even by exchanging the roles of 2 and
3), it means that players 2 and 3 have the same information structure. One just has to choose a,
c 6= a such that I2 (c) = I3 (c) = I2 (a) and d 6= a outside of I2 (c), to end up with a type C. This
concludes the proof.
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